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2010 PATENTLY-O PATENT LAW JOURNAL
The Patent Office’s Fast Track Will Not
Take Us in the Right Direction1
By Kristen Osenga2
June 3, 2010
On June 3, 2010, the Patent Office issued a press release touting an initiative to
reduce patent pendency by allowing patent applicants to pick the speed at which
their applications are examined.3 Patent pendency has been an increasing problem
in the Patent Office, jumping to 34.6 months last year from 26.7 months in 2003.
The proposal has two main prongs: first, provide three paths to patent examination,
and second, rely more heavily on foreign patent office efforts. While the press
release provides some preliminary details about the proposal, further information is
expected to be published in the Federal Register on June 4, 2010. This essay focuses
on the first prong, a multi-tiered patent examination system.
The three tiers proposed by the Patent Office include a “prioritized examination,”
where an applicant could receive expedited examination of a patent application for
an increased fee. The Patent Office would send the first Office Action to the
applicant approximately 4 months after filing, with a patent expected to grant in
about a year. In the press release, the Patent Office did not disclose the additional
fee, noting instead that public input about the technologies that would benefit from
an expedited system will be helpful in setting the fees. At the opposite end of the
spectrum, the Patent Office proposes allowing applicants to delay examination of a
patent application by up to 30 months. (Let’s call this track “deferred examination.”)
The middle tier keeps patent examination at the status quo (“regular examination”).
Patent Office Director David Kappos contends that pendency of all patent
applications will be improved by this multi-tier system because additional resources
will be poured into the prioritized examination tier, thereby increasing potential
output, and because some applicants that choose deferred examination may
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ultimately decide to forgo examination completely (and abandon their applications),
thereby removing those applications from the Patent Office’s workload. (Director
Kappos also contends that the reliance on foreign patent office efforts will allow for
greater efficiency at the Patent Office and may discourage some applicants who first
file in other countries from requesting examination in the United States.) In
addition to the prioritized examination track moving faster, Kappos believes that
patents in the regular examination track will benefit from applicants opting into the
deferred examination track – “There’s a component of this proposal that a rising tide
lifts all boats….It’s like having someone in the butcher shop get out of line in front of
you,” he noted in a Wall Street Journal article.4
Although I am encouraged that the Patent Office is thinking outside of their usual
box, I don’t think this proposal is the right way to go. I’ve thought about patent
pendency quite a bit, and I wrote a law review article in 2005 proposing a similar,
but in my opinion better, multi-tiered patent system.5 Here’s why I think that the
Patent Office’s proposal takes us down the wrong track and offer some suggestions
that might better solve the problem of patent pendency.
The three tiers proposed by the Patent Office are a step in the right direction. Some
applications need to be granted quickly, others do not require such haste. But that
isn’t the whole story – applicant motivation has much more to do with their
behavior and choices. Let’s start at the slow end. Everyone knows that some patent
applications are filed where the applicant has no intention of litigating or licensing
the patent (i.e., exercising the patent’s exclusionary right). The applicant may not be
able to commercialize the invention, may not be certain of its value, and may be in
no position to enforce it – the stereotypical garage inventor. However, the greater
percentage of applicants in this category are big corporations who apply for patents,
not because they plan to litigate and license the patents, but rather because there is
a certain caché and power to having a large patent portfolio. Professor Ann Bartow
has called this type of patents “portfolio fiber.”6 The Patent Office hopes that the
applicants of these inventions will opt for the deferred examination track, waiting
up to 30 months for examination of the application and (hopefully?) abandoning the
application altogether. But if we look at the motivation behind these applicants, it is
highly unlikely that deferred examination will be their chosen route. Both the
garage inventor and the corporation seeking portfolio fiber are looking for a patent.
Period. The strength of the patent doesn’t really matter – the existence of a patent
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does. For this reason, these applicants are highly unlikely to choose a route that will
further delay their objective. So who exactly is going to choose the slow route?
Maybe pharmaceutical companies, who are mired in the FDA regulatory process and
are in no hurry? But probably not the applicants that are likely to later abandon the
applications. Thus, the Patent Office’s workload remains the same, but time-shifted.
Further, the deferred examination route has some issues – a number of which have
been discussed before when analyzing true deferred examination as is available in
other countries. Even with this new proposal, some (like AIPLA director Q. Todd
Dickinson in the same WSJ article) have pointed out that deferred examination
allows the potential for companies to hide applications from competitors. While
mandatory publication of deferred examination applications at 18 months might
provide some relief from this concern, there is still the well-known issue that what
is published is rarely, if ever, what is issued. Deferred examination delays
exposition of the true scope of the patent for a very, very long time.
Let’s move on to the fast track or prioritized examination. The Patent Office believes
that certain applicants will be willing to pay an additional fee for a speedy
examination of their patent applications. Well, who wouldn’t? Because a patent’s
term lasts 20 years from the date of filing but can’t be enforced until issued, who
wouldn’t want the ability to enforce their patent sooner than later? There may a
difference of having 19 years of effective patent life under the prioritized
examination system to having some 15 years (or less) with regular examination, and
even less with deferred examination.
The Patent Office believes certain
technologies will avail themselves of this option, and I agree that there is a benefit to
expedited examination in certain circumstances. Quickly obsolescing technologies,
like computer software and hardware, may receive no real benefit at all from a
patent that issues 3-6 years after filing, well after the technology has peaked.
However, making this track an option simply upon payment of an additional fee will
not discourage many big companies from taking the quicker route, regardless of the
technology involved. As more applicants opt for the prioritized examination track, it
becomes less likely that the expedited track will not be just as backlogged as
regulation examination and less likely that pendency will decrease in any
meaningful way. And with this hastened examination, isn’t it possible that the
patents issued will have received less scrutiny in the Patent Office’s bid to make the
year deadline (and therefore be “bad” patents)? Even the applicants that the Patent
Office hopes will choose deferred examination may choose prioritized examination
if they have the financial wherewithal. Remember, those applicants are generally
just seeking to have a patent. A final disposition (including a patent grant)
“guaranteed” within a year brings them that much closer to their primary objective.
If no one opts for the deferred examination and most everyone chooses the
prioritized examination, we find ourselves back at the same place we are today.
As I noted, at least the Patent Office is thinking in the right direction; they just
haven’t thought hard enough. I have some suggestions about how the Patent Office
can tweak its proposal to take into account the motivations of patent applications,
and thus truly take advantage of a multi-tier patent application system. More details
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can be found in my article referenced above, but the basics are as follows: Think
about the patent system as a highway; applicants enter the highway from one of a
few entrance points and either exit by obtaining a patent or abandoning their
application. Sure, this is an oversimplification, but it helps to make the point.
Some people just want to have a patent – they don’t intend to litigate or license.
Maybe they are a garage inventor, maybe they are seeking portfolio fiber, or maybe
they are simply vain and want their name on something. The point is the existence,
not the strength, of a patent. Let’s call them, with no disrespect, Sunday drivers.
Rather than expecting these applicants to delay the grant of their patent, let’s give
them a patent right away after a mere cursory examination, let’s call it a “primary
patent.” These applicants would pay the existing patent application fee – after all,
they are seeking a patent and have opted into this system. This type of patent might
be just what these applicants are looking for. The benefits of this type of patent are
that few Patent Office resources are spent examining these applications, the
applicants gets almost-immediate gratification for their needs, and the issuance of a
patent would provide instant publication, obviating the concern about companies
using deferred examination to hide inventions from competitors. Maybe the patent
hasn’t been fully examined, but since the applicant doesn’t intend to litigate or
license anyway, so what? In exchange for receiving a nearly-immediate patent, the
applicant gives up the ability to sue based on this patent. However, holders of
primary patents are not forbidden from exercising their exclusionary rights, they
simply have to convert the patent to a regular patent, subject to a full examination
(see the enforcement patent, discussed below). For many of the Sunday drivers, this
type of patent will satisfy their purposes.
On the other hand, there are other people who need a patent and fast. Their
technology may have a life of some 5 years or less. They don’t need a 20-year
patent, but they do need one now – think semiconductors, computers, and software,
where the technology evolves rapidly. Let’s call these applicants ambulance drivers,
again with no disrespect. The value of these inventions is clear, but the value of a
patent relies in part on its expedient grant. The prioritized examination system is
exactly what these applicants need, but they will be stuck in a traffic jam with all
sorts of other applicants who would rather pay than wait. Basically, in serving as
little deterrent in the Patent Office’s proposed system, the requirement of more fees
is not likely to guarantee that applications can be examined any more quickly, since
the Patent Office’s ability to retain its own income is always subject to Congress’s
whimsy.7
To truly provide a fast-track patent, the system must not be so attractive as to
attract everyone and the Patent Office is going to need some help to meet that one
year goal. For these applications, I propose a quicker, shorter patent, let’s call it a
“techno-patent” although the choice to proceed in this way is not determined by the
Even if the Patent Office is able to keep more of its money, I am still unconvinced that the
Patent Office will be any faster or more efficient.
7
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technology, but rather by the applicant regardless of field. The application would
require the proposed higher fee of an enforcer patent, but would cost less than the
primary patent. The patent would be guaranteed to grant in one year, but there are
substantial non-monetary costs to this route. Particularly, the negatives of choosing
a techno-patent include having a patent that is not enforceable for 20 years after
filing, but rather something shorter, such as 6 years (a 5-year effective patent term).
Further, the applicant would be required to submit a patent search, as well as a
statement of why its application is patentable over the prior art uncovered in the
search. While this alone may deter some applicants from choosing this route, if this
track is still jammed with applicants, there could be modifications to the estoppel
rules, the inequitable conduct standards, and even the presumption of validity for
these patents to make the route even less attractive. Further, by providing to the
Patent Office the search results and a patentability statement, the first step of
examination is practically done, leaving less for the Patent Office to do. This would
increase the likelihood that the Patent Office can actually live up to the guaranteed
patent grant within a year. (Sure, examination support documents and the like have
been widely criticized; but in order to meet that one-year deadline, we need to give
the Patent Office some assistance.) In addition, these quickly developing
technologies are the ones most likely to suffer from a dearth of prior art, in part due
to the rapidity of development and in part due to the fact that these applications are
sometimes in areas where patent protection has been iffy at best. The applicant, in
these cases, is likely to have a better grip on the prior art than the Patent Office. The
resulting patent is therefore probably going to receive a more complete
examination, even at greater speed, and even if a “bad” patent slips through, there is
the safety net that the patent’s term is shortened.
Finally, some people just need a patent in normal course. For this type of applicant,
the Patent Office should issue what I call an “enforcer patent.” These patents, unlike
primary patents, would be subject to examination in its current fashion. Unlike
techno-patents, these applications would be examined in the order they are
received for each subject area. Enforcer patent applications would be subject to
higher fees than today’s patent applicants (and the same as the fees for a technopatent), but it would be less than proposed for a primary patent. This would
encourage applicants to think just a bit harder about the worth of a patent for the
invention. But nothing additional would be required. Holders of enforcer patents
would be able to sue alleged infringers, just as they can now. Applicants would be
able to choose this type of patent application at the time of filing. Additionally,
holders of primary patents would be able to convert their applications to enforcer
patents by paying the additional fees and subjecting the applications to the same
examination that is performed on enforcer patents. Primary patents could be
converted to enforcer patents at any time during the primary patent’s life, but the
expiration date of the patent would remain the same, 20 years from the date of first
filing. This track should proceed more smoothly than today’s patent system,
because the appropriate applicants would be opting for (and not overwhelming) the
techno-patent track and because the primary patent path would be attractive
enough to encourage a sizable number of applicants to forgo examination, at least
initially.
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My suggestions are better than the system proposed by the Patent Office. The
proposed system does too little to deter applicants from choosing the prioritized
examination track, which in the end will just end up with the prioritized track
suffering from the same backlog as the current system (or even worse, with the
Patent Office issuing patents without sufficient scrutiny, resulting in even more bad
patents). There is also no real incentive to opt for deferred examination, because
remaining in the regular examination track still provides ample time to analyze
whether the costs of going forward are worthwhile. In fact, many commentators
believe that the current backlog works as a de facto deferred examination system.
The Patent Office’s proposal looks only at the numbers – the months of pendency,
the backlog of applications – but they are ignoring the real motivations that drive
patent applicants. A multi-tiered system may be the answer, but the Patent Office
proposal takes us down the wrong road.
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